Vautour fauve au lever de soleil

I'm not in Vegas this week, but I've been trying to keep up w/ the most interesting stuff. I'm reading this timeline from LinkedIn that summarizes the talk about how OpenAI's agents started weakening their own guardrails and finding ways to communicate and scheme to get further access and privileges. The talk is on Youtube now and is well worth a watch, despite being a little too jargony for such a sensitive and important topic.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=87DyyMV0kCY

I'm reposting this timeline from someone I follow on LinkedIn because it's well written and genuinely scary to boot. It describes how the AI agents figured out how to exchange messages and find an 0day in the very software they were secretly using to communicate.

"7 May - OpenAI starts training new advanced model, no access to internet, multiple versions of model trained at same time (agents), all have access to single thing that downloads latest software updates from internet (package manager)

8 May - Agents discover they can write things to package manager, communicate with each other by posting messages to packet manager

26 May - Agents use hacking technique to make packet manager return some info from the open internet

11 June - OpenAI begins training more intense version of model (OpenAI has no clue agents have had some internet access for 2+ weeks)

26 June - Agents find 0 day in packet manager, get admin access, can install anything they want (reaction in pic), install thing that gives them full internet access

4 July - Agents use package manager to access internet so much they break it.

4 July - OpenAI discovers (broken) package manager has a rogue agent message board, and exploited for internet access. OpenAI stops training, fixes 0 day, deletes package manager, rebuilds it from scratch

6 July - OpenAI restarts training

7 July - Agents discover new way to communicate, by using names of files they store with package manager (essentially)

8 July - agents find creds to unnamed 3rd party org, use to upload files to 3rd party’s site

8 July - upload malicious thing to 3rd party site, have (rebuilt / clean) package manager run malicious thing

8 July - malicious thing takes advantage of second 0 day in package manager, gives agents full admin access, use to reestablish internet access

———

From here internet access leads to 2 events:

Event 1:

8 July - 19 July - agents explore local sandbox, see its running a version of Linux vulnerable to recent CVE. Use CVE to gain full control of sandbox, pivot to gain full control of testing environment, and infrastructure running test

19 July - OpenAI notices, shuts down test / agents

———-

Event 2:

8 July - 13 July - agents exploit two 0 days to gain backend access to Hugging Face (model hosting platform) to solve coding challenge

13 July - Agents get into Hugging Face prod environment, compromise and gain full admin access to multiple Hugging Face clusters (cloud networks), Hugging Face notices

16 July - Hugging Face releases report saying they’ve been hacked by AI

——-

20 July - OpenAI tells Hugging Face to block a bunch of creds from agent sandbox hack.

20 July - Hugging Face says “uhhh we already blocked 2 of those creds from hacking incident we published on 16 July”

7 days after hack ended, OpenAI realizes same model that hacked local sandbox ALSO hacked Hugging Face"

Linkedin post quoted: https://lnkd.in/p/exUsXDBP

Un vautour qui repose ses yeux

Apple's ‘Private Relay’ Is Exposing Users’ Real IP Addresses https://www.404media.co/apples-private-relay-is-exposing-users-real-ip-addresses/

This is neat. A handy demo of how you can be identified and tracked across the Internet without a single cookie ever being set in your browser.

#privacy

I didn't set a cookie. https://kuber.studio/cookie/

Taken a short break for birds before migration starting up. Here’s an old favorite Green heron that I got pretty close.

(comic) Therapist anecdote https://www.workchronicles.com/p/comic-therapist-anecdote